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ABSTRACT 
 
 The current research examined the role that social saturation plays in people’s 
beliefs about the self. Specifically, the current studies examined whether “social 
saturation” predicts the belief that people have multiple selves (as opposed to one single 
true self).  It was hypothesized that greater social saturation would lead to greater belief 
in multiple selves and that this relationship would be mediated by reduced self-reflection 
and increased perceived stress. A preliminary survey study (Study 1) using an adult non-
college student sample supported these predictions, showing that individual differences 
in social saturation positively predicted belief in multiple selves and that this relationship 
was mediated by self-reflection and perceived stress. However, exploratory analyses 
revealed that the relationship between social saturation and belief in multiple selves 
became nonsignificant when controlling for perceived stress, suggesting that perceived 
stress was driving this relationship. Two experimental studies (Studies 2 and 3) using 
college students directly manipulated the objective context (high social saturation vs. 
low social saturation), and revealed that the objective context of saturation did not result 
in the subjective experience of saturation (i.e., overload). Trends in the data revealed that 
participants in the high social saturation (vs. low social saturation) condition actually 
reported less belief in multiple selves (Study 2), less self-alienation and more self-
concept clarity (Study 3). Exploratory analyses revealed that both experimental studies 
showed a similar pattern to the analyses in Study 1, such that greater perceived stress 
was related to greater belief in multiple selves. Implications of both social saturation and 
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stress for self-beliefs are discussed. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
"With every day, and from both sides of my intelligence, the moral and the intellectual, I 
thus drew steadily nearer to the truth, by whose partial discovery I have been doomed to 
such a dreadful shipwreck: that man is not truly one, but truly two." 
– Stevenson, p. 79 
 
 
 In Robert Louis Stevenson's novel, The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde 
(1886), Dr. Jekyll ingests a potion that turns him into his alter self, Mr. Hyde. This alter 
self (i.e., the "evil" self), allows Dr. Jekyll to explore an alternate self, engaging in 
hedonistic crimes while still remaining a respectable, law-abiding man as Mr. Jekyll (his 
"good" self). This undertaking of dual selves eventually reaches a point where Dr. 
Jekyll's "true" self becomes less clear as the self of Mr. Hyde starts to eclipse that of Dr. 
Jekyll. The novel is an early exploration of the theme that personality may consist of 
multiple selves, rather than one true and authentic self.  
 One contemporary theory suggests that the advent of technology has similarly 
changed how we conceptualize our self-concepts (Gergen, 1991). Specifically, Gergen 
argues that we are moving into an age of the "postmodern self,” in which the self is 
fractured into multiple versions because of our immersion in a technological 
environment that fosters constant connection to others and exposure to a multitude of 
alternative options for being. This “populating the self” (p. 68, Gergen, 1991) results in 
the obsolescence of the popular notion of a single “true” self-concept (Kernis & 
  
 
2 
Goldman, 2006). Gergen (1991) terms this new multiplicitous self, the "saturated self," 
and describes it as a self characterized by constant connection to others that is absorbing 
a multitude of (sometimes contradictory) voices and taking in a seemingly endless 
stream of information. This saturation erodes the notion of the self-concept as singular, 
true, or authentic, and instead, gives way to a self consisting of multiple selves. 
 While compelling, Gergen’s ideas have not thoroughly been empirically 
investigated. The proposed studies seek to address this gap in the literature. Specifically, 
the current research seeks to (1) operationalize the concept of social saturation, (2) 
establish a relationship between social saturation and belief in multiple selves, (3) 
experimentally manipulate people's perceived levels of social saturation to better 
examine causality, and (4) examine self-reflection and perceived stress as factors that 
may mediate the proposed relationship between social saturation and belief in multiple 
selves.  
Self-Beliefs Through Time 
 It is important to examine the lay theories that people hold about the nature of 
the self-concept because these lay theories have powerful psychological implications. 
For example, people's belief in a single "true" self seems to have important 
consequences for well-being (Kernis & Goldman, 2006; Schlegel & Hicks, 2011). 
Levels of perceived true self-knowledge (assessed through both self-report and 
experimental manipulation) predict important well-being outcomes (Kernis and 
Goldman, 2006; Lakey, Kernis, Heppner, & Lance, 2007; Schlegel & Hicks, 2011) such 
as self-actualization, vitality, mindfulness, self-esteem, active coping (Kernis & 
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Goldman, 2006), and decreased verbal defensiveness (Kernis & Goldman, 2006; Lakey 
et al., 2007). Studies have also shown that simply thinking about one’s true self confers 
psychological benefits such as greater self-esteem (Andersen & Williams, 1985; Arndt 
& Schimel, 2003), less conformity (Arndt, Schimel, Greenberg, & Pyszcynski, 2002), 
greater self-determination and less psychological defensiveness (Arndt et al., 2002; 
Schimel, Arndt, Pyscynski, & Greenberg, 2001), and less self-handicapping (Arndt et 
al., 2002; Schimel, Arndt, Banko, & Cook, 2004). Further, true self-knowledge and 
expression have been linked to feelings of meaning in life (e.g., Bellah, Madsen, 
Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985; Debats, Drost, & Hansen, 1995; McGregor & Little, 
1998; Schlegel, Hicks, King, & Arndt, 2011; Sheldon & Elliot, 1999; Sheldon & 
Hauser-Marko, 2001), even when the true self is simply made cognitively accessible 
(Schlegel, Hicks, Arndt, & King, 2009).  
 What is surprising about all of these findings regarding true self-knowledge and 
expression is that these effects exist for a self-concept that is not empirically verifiable. 
As Waterman (1984) has suggested, the true self is an abstraction that can never be 
observed or measured directly. Further, the supposition that people literally possess a 
single “true self” is tenuous at best (e.g., Baumeister, 1995) and is challenged by a 
wealth of theoretical (e.g., Cooley, 1902; James, 1890; Sullivan, 1953) and empirical 
(e.g., Andersen & Chen, 2002; Darley & Fazio, 1980; Drigotas, Rusbult, Wieselquist & 
Whitton, 1999; Murray, Holmes & Griffin, 1996) perspectives that point to the pervasive 
influence of environment on the self-concept.  Why then is this potentially illusory self-
concept able to confer such a robust set of positive influences on well-being? The 
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answer likely lies in the beliefs that surround the true self and its existence (e.g., 
Schlegel, Vess, & Arndt, 2012).  This speaks to the psychological power of lay theories 
about the self.  
 Another reason it is important to study lay theories about the self is because they 
change over time. The true self serves as an example of this. Specifically, belief in a 
single true self seems to hold some importance today (as evidenced by the findings 
above), however, this has not always been the case and may not be in the future. Belief 
in a true self seems to be rooted in modern times (i.e., the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries; Gergen, 1991), and before that, was not something that people were concerned 
with. It was not until the 16th century, when people began to show concern with others’ 
deception, that the self was thought of something that was “within” and hidden from 
public view. Before this time, people equated the self with what was outward and easily 
observable to others. This shift in believing in a distinction between a public self and a 
private self may have stemmed from people’s recognition that others had hidden selves. 
That is, concern with knowing the inner selves of others became concern with knowing 
one's own self. Other potential explanations for the emerging concern over the hidden 
self include the Puritans' self-scrutiny over whether they were predestined to go to hell 
or not, the Victorians' concern with involuntary disclosure, and the influence of early 
psychologists such as Freud, who perpetuated the notion that one's inner self is 
composed of hidden drives and impulses (Baumeister, 1987). 
 People's progression toward a belief in a true self may also be explained by the 
drive to fulfill specific needs (e.g., need for meaning, as reviewed above). In medieval 
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times, meaning was given to people through agreed-upon values of religion and 
tradition. However, this gave way to beliefs in growth and change as people abandoned 
Christianity in modern times. Without religion to dictate values, people had to find their 
own moral guide, which resulted in frustration and hostility directed at society. People 
emphasized individual fulfillment in their private lives as a way of escaping the 
perceived oppression of society. However, as communications media and economic 
interdependence became prevalent, society moved into the postmodern era, in which 
people became more immersed in society, moving further away from individuality and 
personal fulfillment (Baumeister, 1987). Gergen's "social saturation" theory (1991) 
supports Baumeister's (1987) assessment of the postmodern era as one that does not 
support individuality and fulfillment, asserting that "social saturation brings with it a 
general loss of true and knowable selves" (p. 16). Given that this loss of belief in a true 
self theorized to be driven by contextual factors such as technological immersion, it 
stands to reason that social saturation may be directly related to the belief that we 
possess multiple, contextually-dependent selves (as opposed to a singular true self). 
Technology and the Self-Concept 
  As discussed above, historical context influences the way people think about the 
nature of the self. Consistent with this notion, Gergen hypothesizes that a shift is 
occurring in which people’s near-constant immersion in a technological context 
influences the way they think about the self by allowing them to choose who they want 
to be from endless options. That is, since we are exposed to an endless stream of 
information through the internet, television, etc., we see and absorb people’s behavior, 
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allowing us to choose who to be from among these options. Although Gergen predicted 
this shift back in 1991, this shift is even more pronounced today as technology continues 
to permeate our lives.  
 Today’s technology has become a major outlet for people to create and experiment 
with multiple selves. Through mediums such as the internet and video games, people are 
able to construct idealized versions of who they are by selectively representing various 
aspects of their selves (e.g., self-promotion on the internet; Buffardi & Campbell, 2008). 
For example, people report that they create online avatars in order to represent idealized 
versions of their self (Bessière, et al., 2007; Duchenaut, Wen, Yee, & Wadley, 2009). 
Klimmt and colleagues (2009) similarly argue that people strive to achieve their 
idealized self by “filling in” a role of a character (e.g., as the hero/heroine; Klimmt, 
Hefner, & Vorderer, 2009). The concept of “filling in” refers a person incorporating 
characteristics of a character into their self-concept (at least temporarily), thus reducing 
discrepancies between one's actual self and ideal self.  
 Further, it is not uncommon for people to create several different selves on the 
internet and in video games, one to fit each role or context. For example, Turkle (1995) 
explored self expression and creation on multiple user domains (MUDS; popular in the 
1970s and 1980s). MUDS are virtual spaces in which people create one or more 
characters and navigate a virtual space and interact with other characters through these 
characters. People control their characters and converse with other characters through 
text commands and only know others through character names; real identities are kept 
anonymous. Through these MUDS, people are able to create multiple selves unlike their 
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real life self or express aspects of their real self that they feel unable to express in real 
life. This self-flexibility, Turkle (1995) argues, actively subverts the traditionalist notion 
of an authentic (i.e., true) self, resulting in a postmodern self that can be multiplied 
endlessly (an argument very similar to Gergen’s). 
 Consistent with the idea that technology facilitates the flexibility of the self, 
empirical studies have shown that internet interactions (compared to face-to-face 
interactions) allow for different forms of self-expression and make different self-
concepts more accessible (e.g., Bargh, McKenna, & Fitzsimons, 2002). Groups that 
people participate in online can also become important parts of one’s self-concept (e.g., 
Davidson, Pennebaker, & Dickerson, 2000). For example, McKenna & Bargh, 1998 
found that members of a virtual group devoted to a marginalized-concealable part of the 
self (e.g., homosexuality, deviant sex interests) considered the group a more important 
part of their self-concept and were more influenced by norms of group membership 
compared to members of mainstream groups (e.g., politics, TV) or marginalized-
conspicuous virtual groups (e.g., obesity, stuttering). Furthermore, members of a 
marginalized-concealable group who felt that the group was important to their self felt 
greater self-acceptance and were more likely to share their secret self with family and 
friends.   
 Taken together, this research suggests that the self is subject to change depending 
on the context, and that technology facilitates the exploration and creation of multiple 
selves. Gergen (1991) argues that with increasing technology, we reach an exaggerated 
version of this process and reach a point in which there are too many possibilities for 
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selves, leading to an overly populated and "saturated" self.  
Social Saturation 
 Gergen (1991) describes the saturated self as one that is characterized by 
multiplicity, fragmentation, and incoherence. This is due to the splitting of the self into a 
multitude of options, which Gergen terms “multiphrenia.” That is, we establish multiple 
selves through absorption of the multiple voices of people in our lives, either in real life 
or through the media. People then internalize these different selves, thus creating a 
seemingly endless pool of selves that they can choose to draw upon depending on the 
needs of the current situation. This makes choosing a single voice or self an increasingly 
difficult task. Gergen (1991) argues that: 
Emerging technologies saturate us with the voices of humankind – both 
harmonious and alien. As we absorb their varied rhymes and reasons, they 
become part of us and we of them. Social saturation furnishes us with a 
multiplicity of incoherent and unrelated languages of the self. For everything we 
“know to be true” about ourselves, other voices within respond with doubt and 
even derision. This fragmentation of self-conceptions corresponds to a 
multiplicity of incoherent and disconnected relationships. These relationships 
pull us in myriad directions, inviting us to play such a variety of roles that the 
very concept of an “authentic self’ with knowable characteristics recedes from 
view. The fully saturated self becomes no self at all. (p. 6-7). 
 
 Gergen (1991) gives the example of a person that is confronted with divorce and 
suggests that he or she will not be shocked or unable to react. Instead, this person will 
have an endless stream of actions to choose from based on what he or she has seen 
played out either in real life or by characters on television or in movies. This 
overabundance of possible selves threatens the notion of a single, consistent self because 
there is nothing that distinguishes a person's own viewpoints from others (i.e., other 
voices and viewpoints are absorbed as one's own). As people become more socially 
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saturated, they simply become imitations of others. 
 Empirical research has only very limitedly examined the construct of social 
saturation or its implications. However, the research that does exist finds support for 
Gergen’s ideas. For example, Ovadia (2003) explored Gergen's (1991) specific 
contention that the saturated self has an increased number and diversity of values that it 
deems important. A values survey that was given to high school seniors in the U.S. 
between 1976 and 1996 revealed that the importance of most values on the survey 
increased, with only one value (finding meaning in life) decreasing in importance. That 
the average perceived importance of all but one of the values increased over time is 
consistent with Gergen’s notion that the saturated self deems an increasingly diverse set 
of values as important.  
 Of particular relevance to the current studies, Dunn and Castro (2012) provided 
some initial evidence for the relationship between social saturation and the belief in 
multiple selves. Specifically, they found that people who use technology more often 
report higher levels of self-pluralism. While this finding does provide initial evidence for 
the implications of social saturation for lay theories of the self, this research is limited by 
the fact that this study is entirely correlational in nature. Thus, we are unable to make 
any causal conclusions about the nature of the relationship. Perhaps people high in self-
pluralism are simply more interested in using technology because it is a vehicle for 
expressing multiple selves.  
 Another potential issue is Dunn and Castro’s (2012) conceptualization of a 
saturated self. By operationalizing social saturation as higher levels of technology usage 
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(specifically levels of TV viewing, internet use, video game exposure, and general 
computer use), it can be argued that their study simply shows that higher technology 
usage is related to self-pluralism (vs. social saturation is related to self-pluralism). I 
explore this issue in the next section.  
Overview of Studies 
Operationalization of the construct of social saturation is a thorny issue. As 
specified in the previous sections, “social saturation” is broadly defined as a self that is 
saturated with endless voices and ways of being that are absorbed through our constant 
connections with others. When social saturation is defined in this way, it is unclear 
whether saturation is the subjective feeling of stress that results from a highly saturated 
environment or simply the objective experience of a highly saturated environment (as 
Dunn & Castro operationalized it).  
I argue that Gergen’s (1991) notion of a saturated self is best conceptualized as 
the subjective experience of information overload (vs. the objective experience of a 
saturated environment). Information overload is a form of stress that people experience 
when external demands exceed their capacity to handle them (Lipowski, 1975). This 
conceptualization of information overload seems particularly relevant to the notion of 
social saturation, given Gergen's (1991) description of the saturated self as a 
"multiphrenic condition, in which one begins to experience the vertigo of unlimited 
multiplicity” (p. 49). This suggests that it may not be simply exposure to technology, but 
the feeling of overload that results in a socially saturated condition. Further, descriptions 
of the saturated condition support the idea that a saturated self is stressed. Gergen argues 
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that options are not only endless, but are no longer constrained by time or distance, and 
because of this, “daily life has become a sea of drowning demands, and there is no shore 
in sight" (p. 75). Gergen (1991) gives a particularly compelling example of how social 
saturation makes even a seemingly simple dilemma such as, “what should I do today?” 
into something complex and stressful by describing a man contemplating what to do 
with his free Saturday. The man starts his day excited about having the freedom to 
choose how he spends his time. He starts to think about what to do with the day, which 
turns into thinking about things that need to be done, which leads him to think of more 
things that he needs to do, which reminds him of other things he would like to do. His 
sense of having a free day has become completely overwhelming with all the options 
and obligations. Further, because of technology, these options are all available 
immediately, which lead to an endlessly expansive list of things to do. This endlessly 
overwhelming list of potentials, Gergen argues, is what the state of social saturation is 
like.  
Based on the description above, it seems reasonable to believe that the objective 
environment of technological immersion fosters the subjective condition of saturation. 
This would explain why Dunn and Castro’s (2012) operationalization of social saturation 
was related to self-pluralism. However, the question of whether the objective state of 
saturation predicts the subjective experience of overload is ultimately an empirical one 
and the current studies seek to address this issue. First, I conducted an initial 
investigation into whether a relationship exists between subjective social saturation and 
belief in multiple selves (Study 1). I then conducted two experimental studies that 
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manipulated participants’ objective contexts in order to examine whether this would 
elicit corresponding shifts in participants subjective experiences of saturation.  
Mediators 
 In addition to exploring the potential relationship between social saturation and 
belief in multiple selves, I also explored decreased self-reflection and increased 
perceived stress as potential mediators. Given Gergen's (1991) description of a saturated 
self as one that is overwhelmed by potentials, this implies that the state of social 
saturation is one in which people do not have time to self-reflect and experience greater 
perceived stress.  
 Self-reflection is characterized as private self-attentiveness motivated by 
“curiosity or epistemic interest in the self” (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999).  Misra & 
Stokols (2012) found that higher levels of overload predicted less time devoted to 
engaging in contemplative activities, suggesting that higher social saturation may lead to 
less self-reflection. Additionally, Cohen (1980) argues that information overload 
increases demands on attentional capacity, suggesting that increased social saturation 
may lead to a lesser capacity for self-reflection. That is, if people feel overloaded with 
technological connection, they may not have time or interest in self-reflection, which 
may make it more difficult for them to integrate self-aspects into a single coherent self. 
Perceived stress may be another mediator of the relationship between social 
saturation and belief in multiple selves. If people do indeed experience “the vertigo of 
unlimited multiplicity” (p. 49; Gergen, 1991) when saturated, it stands to reason that this 
would be a stressful experience. Misra and Stokols (2012) support this notion, showing 
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that people who experienced greater cyber-based and place-based overload (i.e., stress in 
these specific domains) experienced greater perceived general stress (i.e., more 
generalized stress). This suggests that overload (and therefore, potentially social 
saturation) in both cyber and place-based domains is an overwhelming, stressful 
experience that bleeds into a more generalized experience of stress. This may lead to 
greater belief in multiple selves due to preoccupation with stressful experiences which 
may make it difficult for people to think about who they really are. Similar to 
saturation’s predicted relationship with self-reflection, experiencing high levels of 
perceived stress may make it difficult for people to consolidate multiple self-aspects into 
a single self. 
To summarize, my hypotheses are as follows: 
 (H1) Subjective social saturation will be positively related to greater belief in 
multiple selves (Study 1). 
 (H2) Increasing the salience of social saturation through an objectively saturated 
context will elicit a shift in participants’ subjective experience of saturation (Studies 
2 and 3).  
 (H3) Participants in the high social saturation conditions (vs. low social saturation 
conditions) will report greater belief in multiple selves (Studies 2 and 3).  
 (H4) Self-reflection will mediate the relationship between social saturation and belief 
in multiple selves (Studies 1, 2 and 3).  
 (H5) Perceived stress will mediate the relationship between social saturation and 
belief in multiple selves (Studies 1, 2, and 3). 
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CHAPTER II 
STUDY 1 
 
 Study 1 served as an initial assessment of whether a relationship exists between 
subjective social saturation and belief in multiple selves. It was expected that greater 
feelings of social saturation would lead to greater feelings of general perceived stress 
and less self-reflection, which would, in turn, result in greater belief in multiple selves. 
To test this prediction, participants completed measure of subjective social saturation 
(i.e., overload) as well as measures of self-reflection, perceived stress, and belief in 
multiple selves.  
Participants 
Sixty-eight (41 female) individuals recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk) platform participated in the study and were compensated with a payment of 
$0.50. As a participant source, MTurk has been shown to be equally (or more) 
representative and reliable as college students in previous research (Buhrmester, Kwang 
& Gosling, 2011). Participants were from the United States and were diverse in age (M 
= 36.22, SD = 14.57, range 18-72). Reported racial/ethnic backgrounds included: 80.9% 
European American, 7.4% African American/Black, 5.9% more than one race, 4.4% 
Asian American, and 1.5% Hispanic/Latino. 
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Materials and Procedure  
Participants completed the study through an online survey after accepting the job 
posting on Amazon MTurk. Participants completed the measures described below, as 
well as several unrelated measures outside the scope of the current report. 
 Social saturation. Social saturation was assessed using a 32-item scale based on 
the Perceived Information Overload Scale (Misra & Stokols, 2012), which included both 
cyber-based and place-based sources of overload. This scale included items from the 
Perceived Information Overload Scale in addition to several items about social media 
and additional items assessing people’s subjective experience of overload (all items are 
presented in the Appendix). For each item, participants indicated how often they felt or 
thought a certain way using a 5-point scale (1 = never; 5 = very often).  Example items 
included, "In the last month, how often have you felt that you have too many messages 
(e.g., wall postings, event notifications, personal messages, status updates, and 
applications) on your Facebook?" and "In the last month, how often have you felt that 
the demands on you in your work place exceeded your capacity to deal with them?" 
Responses were averaged to create a composite social saturation score (M = 2.23, SD = 
.69, α = .94).1  
Self-reflection. Self-reflection was assessed using the 20-item Self-Reflection 
and Insight Scale (SRIS; Grant, Franklin, & Langford, 2002). Participants indicated their 
agreement with statements such as, “I frequently take time to reflect on my thoughts” 
and "It is important for me to evaluate the things that I do" on a 5-point scale (1 = 
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strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree). Responses were averaged to create a composite 
reflection score (M = 2.48, SD = .88, α = .95). 
 Perceived stress. Perceived stress was assessed using the 14-item Perceived 
Stress Scale (PSS; Cohen, Kamarck, & Mermelstein, 1983). Participants indicated their 
agreement with statements such as, "In the last month, how often have you been upset 
because of something that happened unexpectedly?" and "In the last month, how often 
have you felt difficulties were piling up so high that you could not overcome them?" on 
a 5-point scale (1 = never; 5 = very often). Responses were averaged to create a 
composite perceived stress score (M = 2.71, SD = .59, α = .82). 
Self beliefs. Participants completed three measures in order to assess their belief 
in multiples selves.  First, they completed a measure of belief in multiple selves by 
indicating their agreement with three statements: “People have multiple ‘true’ selves, 
each representing a different role,” "I have multiple selves I can draw qualities from 
depending on the situation,” and "Who I am depends on the environment I'm in" using a 
5-point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree). Responses were averaged to 
create a composite belief in multiple selves score (M = 2.78, SD = 1.03, α = .86).  
Next, participants completed the 30-item Self-Pluralism Scale (SPS-10; 
McReynolds, Altrocchi, & House, 2000). Participants indicated their agreement with 
statements such as, "I act and feel essentially the same way whether at home, at work, or 
with friends" and "Sometimes I feel like two (or more) persons under the same skin" 
using a 5-point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree). Responses were 
averaged to create a composite self-pluralism score (M = 2.34, SD = .67, α = .93).  
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Finally, participants completed the 8-item behavioral change subscale of the 
Dialectical Self Scale (DSS; Spencer-Rodgers, Srivastava, Boucher, English, Paletz, & 
Peng, 2010). Participants indicated their agreement to statements such as, "I often 
change the way I am, depending on who I am with" and "I sometimes find that I am a 
different person by the evening than I was in the morning" using a 7-point scale (1 = 
strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). Responses were averaged to create a behavioral 
change subscale (M = 3.24, SD = .1.05, α = .80).  
Given that the belief in multiple selves scale was very highly correlated with the 
Self-Pluralism Scale (r = .93, p < .001) and the behavioral change subscale of the DSS (r 
= .94, p < .001), and the Self-Pluralism scale was significantly correlated with the 
behavioral change subscale of the DSS (r = .87, p < .001), I standardized each composite 
variable and formed an overall composite belief in multiple selves score.2 
Results and Brief Discussion 
Bivariate correlations between all study variables are presented in Table 1.  
As predicted, greater social saturation was associated with greater perceived 
stress, less self-reflection, and greater belief in multiple selves. This suggests that the 
subjective feeling of social saturation is a stressful experience in which people are less 
self-reflective, and this subjective experience is related to greater beliefs in multiple 
selves. 
In order to examine self-reflection and perceived stress as mediators of the 
relationship between social saturation and belief in multiple selves, bootstrapping 
analyses (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) were conducted in which the number of bootstrap  
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 Table 1 Correlations among variables in Study 1  
 1 2 3 4 
1. Social Saturation  - -.30* -.54* .42* 
2. Self-Reflection  - .33* -.34* 
3. Perceived Stress   - .60* 
4. Belief in Multiple Selves Composite    - 
Note. *p < .05. 
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samples was set to 5,000 and 95% confidence intervals for the bias corrected indirect 
effects were computed. Results indicated that when self-reflection and perceived stress 
were included in the model as mediators, the size of the effect of social saturation on 
belief in multiple selves (total effect  = .38, p < .001) decreased (direct effect  = .10, p = 
.33), a pattern that is consistent with mediation. Further, the indirect effect of social 
saturation on belief in multiple selves through self-reflection and perceived stress was 
significant, as a 95% confidence interval around the indirect effect did not include zero 
(CI = .14, .46). Given that the direct effect became non-significant with the mediators 
included, this suggests full mediation (see Figure 1).  
Exploratory analyses were also conducted in order to investigate whether the 
effect of social saturation on belief in multiple selves was moderated by age. 
Specifically, a regression analysis was conducted to examine social saturation, age, and 
their potential interaction on belief in multiple selves. All variables were standardized 
and the product of the standardized social saturation and age scores was used as the 
interaction term (Aiken & West, 1993). The main effect for saturation was significant (β 
= .40, p = .001), however the main effect for age was not (β = -1.39, p = .17). Further, 
the interaction between social saturation and age was not significant (β = -.05, p = .66), 
indicating that levels of social saturation did not interact with age of participants to 
predict belief in multiple selves.  
Further exploratory analyses were conducted examine whether increased belief in 
multiple selves was simply due to increased general stress, rather than saturation per se. 
Specifically, a regression was conducted where all variables were standardized and  
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Figure 1. Self-reflection and perceived stress fully mediate the relationship between 
social saturation and belief in multiple selves, Study 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
social saturation and perceived stress were entered simultaneously. Results showed that 
when perceived stress was controlled for (β = .48, p < .001), social saturation no longer 
social saturation and perceived stress were entered simultaneously. Results showed that 
when perceived stress was controlled for (β = .48, p < .001), social saturation no longer 
predicted belief in multiple selves (β = .12, p = .25), suggesting that that relationship 
between social saturation and belief in multiple selves may be driven by general 
perceived stress, rather than saturation per se. 
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Study 1 provided initial evidence that greater social saturation (operationalized as 
the subjective experience of overload) is associated with greater belief in multiple selves. 
Further, these results suggest that the specific stress of being socially saturated decreases 
self-reflection and increases general perceived stress, resulting in greater belief in 
multiple selves.  However, further exploratory analyses suggested that the results may be 
driven primarily by general perceived stress. This suggests that social saturation may be 
something that simply contributes to people’s overall feelings of stress and that stress 
influences belief in multiple selves (as opposed to a more direct relationship between 
social saturation and belief in multiple selves). 
However, given that this study is correlational in nature, inferences about 
causality cannot be made. Also, given the similarity of the social saturation and 
perceived stress measures used in this study, it is difficult to separate the two constructs 
since both assess subjective feelings of being hassled or overwhelmed. As such, Studies 
2 and 3 attempted to (1) conceptually replicate these results by experimentally 
manipulating social saturation and (2) better isolate social saturation from general stress 
in order to examine social saturation’s effect (vs. perceived stress’s effect) on belief in 
multiple selves. 
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CHAPTER III 
STUDY 2 
 
 Study 2 attempted to manipulate social saturation through a “calendar task” in 
which participants either detailed every activity that they engage in on a typical weekday 
(high social saturation) or detailed activities that they would plan on engaging in on a 
vacation in which they “unplug” (low social saturation). It was expected that 
manipulating participants’ perceptions of objective experiences of saturation would 
influence participants’ subjective feelings of overload (i.e., the types of feelings 
participants in Study 1 reported). Thus, I predicted that participants in the high social 
saturation condition (vs. low social saturation condition) would report greater belief in 
multiple selves. Further, we expected that this relationship would be mediated by state 
self-reflection and perceived stress.  
We additionally assessed self-concept clarity in order to examine whether social 
saturation influences how well participants feel like they know who they are. Part of 
Gergen’s (1991) theory is that “social saturation brings with it a general loss in our 
assumption of true and knowable selves” (p. 16), which suggests that high social 
saturation may decrease participants’ feelings of self-knowledge.   
Participants  
One hundred and twenty-five (88 female) students enrolled in an introductory 
psychology course at Texas A&M University participated for partial fulfillment of a 
course requirement. Ages ranged from 18-24 (M = 18.47, SD = .91). Reported 
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racial/ethnic backgrounds included: 64% European American, 8.8% Hispanic/Latino, 
2.4% Asian American, 1.6% African American, 0.8% Indian, 0.8% American 
Indian/Alaska Native, and 21.6% more than one race. 
Materials and Procedure 
 Participants completed a paper questionnaire packet in a classroom. Participants 
were informed that they would be participating in a study about their self and personality 
and completed the measures described below.  
 Manipulation of social saturation. Participants were randomly assigned to one 
of two conditions: high social saturation or low social saturation. In the high social 
saturation condition, participants completed a “calendar task” in which they indicated 
everything that they would do on a typical weekday (24-hour time period), including 
activities such as technology use. It was expected that having participants fill out the 
calendar with the numerous activities that they do on a daily basis would increase the 
salience of the experience of saturation. In the low saturation condition, participants 
completed the same calendar task, only they indicated everything they would do on a 
day on vacation (24-hour time period) with no access to technology. It was expected that 
this low saturation condition would decrease the salience of the experience of saturation. 
Participants in the high social saturation condition were given the following instructions: 
Please take a moment to imagine your average weekday. What do you do? 
Where do you go? Using the calendar pages provided below, please indicate 
everything that you would do throughout the day during each time period. Please 
do not forget to list things like, “riding the bus to campus,” “going on the 
computer,” “talking on the phone,” and “texting.” We want you to really try to 
get at what your full experience would be throughout the day, so please try to be 
as specific/thorough as you possibly can! Also, if you would be engaged in 
multiple activities at once (e.g., watching TV and texting), please list all of those 
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in the box, even if you would not be texting the entire time. For hours that you 
would spend sleeping, please indicate this with an “X”.  
  
Participants in the low social saturation condition were given the following instructions: 
Please take a moment to imagine that you are on vacation on a beautiful tropical 
island. You are “going off the grid” to get away from it all, which means you 
have no cell phone signal and no internet connection. Think about what you 
would like to do while you are on this vacation. Where on the island would you 
go? What kinds of things would you do? Using the calendar pages provided 
below, please indicate everything that you would do during your vacation on this 
island. We want you to really try to get at what your full experience would be 
throughout a day spent on this vacation, so please try to be as specific/thorough 
as you possibly can! Also, if you plan to be engaged in multiple activities at once 
(e.g., reading a book and watching the ocean), please list all of those in the box, 
even if you wouldn’t’ be looking at the ocean the entire time. For the hours that 
you plan to spend sleeping, please indicate this with an “X”. 
 
Participants in both conditions were given a “calendar” to fill in their activities during a 
24-hour period (see Appendix).  
The goal of this manipulation was to induce the same types of feelings of 
overload reported by participants in Study 1. Thus, we had participants respond to items 
that were based on the social saturation scale used in Study 1 as a manipulation check. 
Participants responded to the following questions: “Right now, how compelled do you 
feel to look at your phone?”, “Right now, how compelled do you feel to check your 
email?”, “Right now, how compelled do you feel to update your Facebook, Twitter, 
message/chat application, etc.?”,“Right now, how hassled do you feel with all the 
demands in your school, home, or work environment?”, and “Right now, how much do 
you feel like you are constantly shuffling between activities or demands?”. Participants 
responded to each item using a 5-point scale (1 = not at all; 5 = very much) and 
responses were averaged to create a composite score for (M = 2.74, SD = .81, α = .75).3 
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State self-reflection. State self-reflection was assessed using an adapted version 
of the 20-item Self-Reflection and Insight Scale (SRIS; Grant et al., 2002). Participants 
were given activities such as, “thinking about my thoughts,” and “spending time in self-
reflection” and asked to indicate (1) how much time they spend engaged in this behavior 
on a 5-point scale (1 = no time at all; 5 = very much time and (2) how interested they are 
in engaging in this behavior on a 5-point scale (1 = not at all interested; 5 = very 
interested). Interest in engaging in self-reflection was included in addition to time spent 
in self-reflection in order to include a more state-oriented (vs. trait-oriented) measure of 
participants’ self-reflection. Specifically, it may be more difficult to influence a report 
on behavior than on interest in a behavior.  Responses were averaged to create two 
composite state self-reflection scores, one for time engaged in activities (M = 3.22, SD = 
.51, α = .77), and one for interest in engaging in activities (M = 3.29, SD = .56, α = .81).  
State perceived stress. Perceived stress was assessed using an adapted version of 
the 14-item Perceived Stress Scale (PSS; Cohen et al., 1983). Participants indicated their 
agreement with statements such as, “I feel upset because of something that happened 
unexpectedly” and “I feel like my difficulties are piling up so high that I cannot 
overcome them” on a 5-point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree). 
Responses were averaged to create a composite state perceived stress score (M = 2.76, 
SD = .51, α = .71). 
Self-concept clarity. Self-concept clarity was assessed using the 12-item Self-
Concept Clarity Scale (Campbell, Trapnell, Heine, Katz, Lavallee, & Lehman, 1996). 
Participants indicated their agreement with statements such as, “My beliefs about myself 
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often conflict with one another,” and “I spend a lot of time wondering about what kind 
of person I really am” on a 5-point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree). 
Responses were averaged to create a composite self-concept clarity score (M = 3.56, SD 
= .86, α = .89). 
Other measures. Participants also completed the same measures assessing belief 
in multiple selves that were used in Study 1 (belief in multiple selves (M = 2.97, SD = 
.95, α = .77), self-pluralism (M = 2.38, SD = .58, α = .87), and the behavioral change 
subscale of the DSS (M = 2.35, SD = .61, α = .67). Belief in multiple selves scale was 
significantly correlated with the Self-Pluralism Scale (r = .58, p < .001) and the 
behavioral change subscale of the DSS (r = .60, p < .001), and the Self-Pluralism scale 
was significantly correlated with the behavioral change subscale of the DSS (r = .72, p < 
.001). However, given that the correlations between these variables were not as high as 
in Study 1, a composite score was not used. 4 
Results and Brief Discussion 
Descriptive statistics and t-tests for all study variables are reported in Table 2 and 
bivariate correlations between all study variables are presented in Table 3.  
As can be seen in the table, the results for the manipulation check revealed that, 
contrary to expectations, the manipulation did not result in significant differences in 
participants’ subjective experience of social saturation for either compulsion (p = .97) or 
hassle (p = .60). Further, there were no significant differences in perceived stress 
between conditions (p = .68), suggesting that participants did not perceive the high social
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Table 2  t-tests, means, and standard deviations for all dependent variables, Studies 2 and 3 
 
  Study 2 Study 3 
      
High 
Saturation 
Low 
Saturation     
High 
Saturation 
Low 
Saturation 
  t p M SD M SD t p M SD M SD 
Manipulation Check 0.20 0.85 2.75 0.79 2.72 0.87 0.83 0.41 3.01 0.41 2.93 0.58 
Multiple Selves 
Composite -1.64 0.10 2.48 0.81 2.66 0.07 -0.57 0.57 2.94 0.64 2.99 0.57 
Multiple Selves -1.21 0.23 2.88 1.00 3.08 0.90 -0.09 0.93 2.94 0.98 2.95 0.96 
Self-Pluralism -1.98 0.05 2.28 0.57 2.47 0.57 -0.95 0.34 2.39 0.57 2.48 0.53 
DSS Behavioral Change -1.22 0.22 2.30 0.63 2.43 0.57 -0.72 0.47 3.49 0.61 3.57 0.60 
Time Spent Self-
Reflection -0.34 0.74 3.20 0.50 3.23 0.51 -0.002 1.00 3.27 0.45 3.27 0.48 
Interested in Self-
Reflection -1.35 0.18 3.21 0.52 3.34 0.59 -0.11 0.91 3.35 0.44 3.36 0.48 
State Stress 0.41 0.68 2.79 0.57 2.76 0.48 0.08 0.94 2.25 0.83 2.23 0.97 
Self-Concept Clarity 0.87 0.39 3.63 0.85 3.49 0.87 1.95 0.05 3.66 0.70 3.44 0.69 
Positive Mood       0.40 0.69 3.60 0.73 3.55 0.70 
Negative Mood       0.22 0.83 1.54 0.59 1.52 0.66 
Arousal       0.19 0.85 2.84 0.57 2.82 0.59 
Self-Alienation       -1.58 0.12 1.87 0.74 2.09 0.94 
                          
 
Note. df for all variables in Study 2 were 127, except for the manipulation check (df = 126); df for all variables in Study 3 were 
142. 
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Table 3 Correlations among variables in Study 2. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Manipulation Check (Social Saturation) - .13 -.03 .29* -.08 .13 .12 .12 
2. Time Engaged in Self-Reflection  - .59* .04 -.15 .18* .05 .15 
3. Interest in Self-Reflection   - -.06 -.26* .14 .12 .14 
4. State Perceived Stress    - -.46* .25* .38* .25* 
5. Self-Concept Clarity     - -.48* -.72* -.55* 
6. Belief in Multiple Selves      - .58* .58* 
7. Self-Pluralism       - .71* 
8. Behavioral Change        - 
Note. *p < .05. 
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saturation condition to be any more saturated or stressful than the low saturation 
condition.  
Analyses also revealed that the differences between conditions were also non-
significant for most of the dependent variables. However, there were a few trends 
observed that were in the opposite direction of what we hypothesized. Specifically, 
participants in the high social saturation condition reported marginally less self-
pluralism than participants in the low social saturation condition (p = .05). Trends also 
revealed that participants in the high social saturation reported less belief in multiple 
selves (p = .23) and less behavioral change (p = .22) than participants in the low social 
saturation condition.  
Interestingly, trends revealed that participants were less interested in self-
reflection in the high social saturation condition (p = .18)., which may indicate that 
participants are not motivated to think very deeply about the self when immersed in this 
environment (consistent with Carr’s [2010] shallowing hypothesis). However, this effect 
did not replicate in Study 3.  
All of the other dependent variables reveal small differences between conditions, 
but all other differences were in the opposite direction of the hypothesized pattern.  
Of course, interpreting any differences between conditions is also complicated by 
the fact that the manipulation did not influence subjective saturation (at least as we 
assessed it). However, an examination of the correlations (collapsed across conditions) 
does allow for a comparison of these results with Study 1 (see Table 3). Results revealed 
that the manipulation check (i.e., subjective social saturation) and state perceived stress 
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were significantly positively correlated. This is consistent with results from Study 1 
showing that subjective social saturation was significantly positively correlated with 
perceived stress.  However, counter to Study 1, subjective social saturation was not 
significantly correlated with the self-belief variables (belief in multiple selves, self-
pluralism, and behavioral change at the bivariate level). By comparison, and consistent 
with Study 1, state perceived stress was significantly positively correlated with belief in 
multiple selves, self-pluralism, and behavioral change, and negatively associated with 
self-concept clarity. These analyses suggest that general stress is a more important 
predictor than social saturation of self-beliefs, a pattern that is consistent with the 
regression analyses from Study 1.  
Study 2 found that participants’ subjective feelings of saturation were not 
influenced by thinking about high or low saturated contexts. No differences were found 
between high and low saturation conditions in the manipulation check or in perceived 
stress, suggesting that thinking about hypothetical high saturation (vs. low saturation) 
environments was not stressful for our college student sample. It is possible that college 
students are generally more accustomed to saturated environments than the older adults 
in Study 1 and do not perceive this type of environment to be stressful. Consistent with 
this idea, any differences that did exist between conditions in self-beliefs were in the 
opposite direction as predicted. Finally, casting further doubt on the role of saturation in 
self-beliefs, the patterns in the bivariate correlations suggested that general stress was a 
better predictor of self-beliefs than subjective saturation. 
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 One limitation of Study 2, however was the use of a hypothetical manipulation. 
Thus, Study 3 was conducted using a more direct manipulation of social saturation. 
Instead of participants simply imagining a high or low saturation context, they actually 
experienced one of these two contexts. It may be that the experience of real versus 
hypothetical saturation will more effectively increase or decrease the salience of the 
experience of saturation. 
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CHAPTER IV 
STUDY 3 
 
 Study 3 attempted to manipulate people’s perceived levels of saturation using a 
manipulation that actually immersed participants in either a more or less saturated 
environment. Participants walked through either a high socially saturated area or a low 
socially saturated area on campus and were told to either check their email, social 
networking sites, etc. during their walk (high social saturation) or to leave their 
belongings and cell phone behind before their walk (low social saturation). We again 
expected that by manipulating participants’ objective experience of saturation, 
participants in the high social saturation condition (vs. low social saturation condition) 
would report higher subjective feelings of stress and less self-reflection, leading to 
greater belief in multiple selves.  
Participants 
One hundred and forty-four (101 female) students enrolled in an introductory 
psychology course at Texas A&M University participated for partial fulfillment of a 
course requirement. Ages ranged from 18-28 (M = 18.73, SD = 1.56). Reported 
racial/ethnic backgrounds included: 66.2% European American, 13.4% Hispanic/Latino, 
9.2% more than one race, 5.6% Asian American, 4.2% African American/Black, and 
1.4% Indian. 
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Materials and Procedure 
 Manipulation of social saturation. Participants were randomly assigned to one 
of two conditions: high or low social saturation. Participants in the high social saturation 
condition walked through the student center on campus (the Memorial Student Center) 
and were encouraged to check their email, social networking sites, etc. from their cell 
phone. It was expected that this task would increase the feeling of social saturation due 
to participants’ immersion in the busy environment of the student center coupled with 
connection to technology via their cell phones. Participants in the low social saturation 
condition walked through an art gallery (the J. Wayne Stark Art Galleries, located in the 
Memorial Student Center) and were asked to leave their belongings and cell phones 
behind while they completed this task. It was expected that this task would decrease the 
feeling of saturation due to the quiet environment of the art gallery and the lack of 
connection to technology via cell phone. Both locations were centrally located on the 
main campus of Texas A&M University. Participants in the high social saturation 
condition were told: 
We all know that college students have busy and sometimes stressful lives. Studies 
have shown that doing a simple physical activity as a “mental break” before 
engaging in a task that requires mental effort reduces stress and aids in concentration 
and performance. In order to improve your concentration in this study, we will have 
you complete a “mental break” task. In this task, we would like you to walk through 
the Memorial Student Center (MSC) for eight minutes and then come back to this 
location, where you will fill out a questionnaire that assesses your personality and 
beliefs about the self. You will be given a timer to keep track of time. When the 
timer beeps after 8 minutes, please push the start/stop button on the front of the timer 
once to stop the timer and head back to the research assistant. Given that this is 
supposed to be a “mental break,” we encourage you to talk to your friends if you see 
them, take out your cell phone and check your email, send text messages, or check 
your Facebook/Twitter/other social networking sites as you walk through the MSC, 
as these types of activities have been shown to be mentally refreshing. 
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Participants in the low social saturation condition were told: 
We all know that college students have busy and sometimes stressful lives. Studies 
have shown that doing a simple physical activity as a “mental break” before 
engaging in a task that requires mental effort reduces stress and aids in concentration 
and performance. In order to improve your concentration in this study, we will have 
you complete a “mental break” task. In this task, we would like you to walk through 
the art gallery for eight minutes and then come back to this location, where you will 
fill out a questionnaire that assesses your personality and beliefs about the self. You 
will be given a timer to keep track of time. When the timer beeps after 8 minutes, 
please push the start/stop button on the front of the timer once to stop the timer and 
head back to the research assistant. Given that this is supposed to be a “mental 
break,” we would like you to leave your belongings, including your cell phone 
behind so that you cannot check your email, send text messages, or check your 
Facebook/Twitter/other social networking sites as you walk through the gallery, as 
“disconnecting” from these types of activities has been shown to be mentally 
refreshing. 
 
Following the manipulation, participants in the high saturation condition 
completed several questionnaires in a hallway of the student center (which was typically 
a crowded, busy area); participants in the low saturation condition completed these 
questionnaires in a quiet room in the back of the art gallery. We used different 
manipulation check items from those in Study 2 in order to more closely get at 
participants’ feelings of being connected and overloaded in their current context (vs. the 
items in Study 2, which emphasized their more general environments as well as feeling 
compelled to check their phones, update Facebook, etc.). Participants responded to the 
following manipulation check items: “Right now, how much do you feel like you are 
overloaded with things to do?”, “Right now, how hassled do you feel with your 
environment?”, and “Right now, how much do you feel like you are constantly dealing 
with demands on your time?”  (M = 2.92, SD = .87, α = .68).5  
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State stress and arousal. Since we did not find differences between saturation 
conditions in perceived stress in Study 2, we included a measure that might better 
capture participants’ stress and arousal in the moment. State perceived stress and arousal 
were assessed using the 20-item Stress Arousal Adjective Checklist (SACL; King, 
Burrows, & Stanley, 1983; Mackay, Cox, Burrows, & Lazzerini; 1978). Participants 
indicated the extent to which they were experiencing emotions related to stress (e.g., 
“worried”, “distressed) and arousal (e.g., “active”, “alert”) on a 5-point scale (1 = not at 
all; 5 = very much). Responses were averaged to create a composite stress score (M = 
2.24, SD = .90, α = .75) and a composite arousal score (M = 2.83, SD = .58, α = .73).  
Positive and negative affect. Given that Study 2 did not turn out as expected, we 
also added a measure of positive and negative affect to assess whether time spent in a 
high or low saturation environment influenced participants’ mood more generally (i.e., 
independent of stress). Positive and negative affect were assessed using the 12-item 
Scale of Positive and Negative Experience (SPANE; Diener et al., 2010). Participants 
indicated the extent to which they were experiencing emotions related to positive affect 
(e.g., “good”, “pleasant”) and negative affect (e.g., “bad”, “unpleasant”) on a 5-point 
scale (1 = not at all; 5 = very much). Responses were averaged to create a composite 
positive affect score (M = 3.28, SD = .71, α = .88) and a negative affect score (M = 1.53, 
SD = .63, α = .87).  
Self-alienation. Since Gergen claims that social saturation results in a “general 
loss of true and knowable selves” (p. 16), it is possible that people feel alienated from 
their self in highly saturated contexts. As such, I assessed self-alienation using the 4-item 
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subscale from the Authenticity Scale (Wood, Linley, Maltby, Baliousis, & Joseph, 
2008). Participants indicated the extent to which they agreed with statements such as, “I 
don’t know how I really feel inside,” and “I feel as if I don’t know myself very well” on 
a 5-point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree). Responses were averaged to 
create a composite self-alienation score (M = 1.99, SD = .86, α = .87). 
Other measures. Participants completed the same measure of state self-reflection 
that was used in Study 2, which included time engaged in self-reflective activities (M = 
3.27, SD = .46, α = .74) and interest in engaging in self-reflective activities (M = 3.35, 
SD = .46, α = .72). Participants additionally completed the same measures of self-
concept clarity (M = 3.54, SD = .70, α = .83) that were used in Study 2 as well as the 
same measures assessing belief in multiple selves (belief in multiple selves (M = 2.95, 
SD = .97, α = .76), self-pluralism (M = 2.44, SD = .55, α = .87), and the behavioral 
change subscale of the DSS (M = 3.53, SD = .60, α = .69) that were used in Studies 1 
and 2. The belief in multiple selves scale was significantly correlated with the Self-
Pluralism Scale (r = .55, p < .001) and the behavioral change subscale of the DSS (r = 
.56, p < .001), and the Self-Pluralism scale was significantly correlated with the 
behavioral change subscale of the DSS (r = .72, p < .001), however, correlations were 
not as high as in Study 1, so a composite variable was not used. Finally, participants in 
both high and low saturation conditions responded to the following compliance check 
items: “Please write briefly about what you did in the walking task that you completed at 
the beginning of the study. Where did you go? What did you see? How did you feel?” 
and “Do you own a smartphone?” Participants in the high saturation condition only 
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responded to the following compliance check item: “During your walk at the beginning 
of the study, did you check your smartphone?” (participants in the low saturation 
condition left their cell phones and belongings with the research assistant).6 
Results and Brief Discussion 
Descriptive statistics and t-tests for all study variables are reported in Table 3. 
Bivariate correlations between all study variables are presented in Table 4.  
 As can be seen in the table, the results for the manipulation check revealed that, 
again, contrary to expectations, the manipulation check did not result in significant 
differences in participants’ subjective experience of social saturation (p = .41). Further, 
there were no significant differences in stress between conditions (p = .94), supporting 
the notion that there is a disconnect between the objective and subjective experience of 
social saturation (consistent with Study 2).   
Also consistent with Study 2, but contrary to hypotheses, differences between 
conditions were non-significant for most of the dependent variables. However, there 
were some trends that were in the opposite direction of hypotheses (also consistent with 
Study 2). Specifically, trends revealed that participants in the high social saturation 
condition reported less self-alienation (p = .12) and greater self-concept clarity (p = .05) 
than participants in the low social saturation condition. 
An examination of the correlations (collapsed across conditions) allows for a 
comparison of these results with Studies 1 and 2 (see Table 3). Results revealed that 
subjective social saturation and state stress were significantly positively correlated, a 
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pattern that is consistent with Studies 1 and 2 (showing a positive relationship between 
social saturation and perceived stress). However, social saturation was not significantly  
correlated with belief in multiple selves or self-knowledge. Also consistent with Studies 
1 and 2, state stress was significantly positively related to self-pluralism (but not belief 
in multiple selves or behavioral change) and self-alienation, but negatively related to 
self-concept clarity, suggesting that stress is more important for predicting self-beliefs 
than social saturation.  
Taken together, these results are consistent with findings from both Studies 1 and 
2 providing additional supporting evidence for objective social saturation’s lack of 
influence on subjective feelings of saturation/overload. Further, these results support the 
notion that perceived stress is more important than social saturation for belief in multiple 
selves, since perceived stress was related to the dependent variables and social saturation 
was not.  
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Table 4 Correlations among variables in Study 3.  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Manipulation Check (Social Saturation) - .04 -.05 .59* -17* -.36* .46* -.11 .03 .00 .11 .009 
2. Time Engaged in Self-Reflection  - .66* -.03 .01 .05 -.04 .07 -.10 -.05 -.07 -.11 
3. Interest in Self-Reflection   - -.11 .03 .16 -.03 -.02 -.07 -.11 .03 -.01 
4. State Stress    - -.17* -.64* .71* -.14 .21* .04 .17* .15 
5. State Arousal     - .45* -.15 .16 -.12 -.06 -.13 -.08 
6. Positive Affect      - -.55* -.23* -.30* -.12 -.30* -.22* 
7. Negative Affect       - -.06 .25* -.02 .15 .04 
8. Self-Concept Clarity        - -.61* -.46* -.71* -.57* 
9. Self-Alienation         - .24* .43* .34* 
10. Belief in Multiple Selves          - .55* .56* 
11. Self-Pluralism           - .72* 
12. Behavioral Change            - 
Note. *p < .05.
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CHAPTER V 
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Recent empirical research has begun to examine the variety of ways that 
technology influences the self-concept (e.g., Bessière et al., 2007; Ducheneaut et al, 
2009; Klimmt et al., 2009). However, research has only very limitedly examined 
Gergen’s (1991) conception of social saturation and how this state influences beliefs 
about the self (e.g., Dunn & Castro, 2012). To my knowledge, the current studies are the 
first to attempt to experimentally manipulate the construct of social saturation and 
examine how this influences beliefs about the self.  
Study 1 provided preliminary support to the prediction that subjective social 
saturation is positively associated with greater belief in multiple selves and that this 
relationship is mediated by decreased self-reflection and increased perceived stress. 
Dunn and Castro (2012) find the same relationship between social saturation and self-
pluralism, although they operationalized social saturation as an objective experience (vs. 
a subjective experience, as in the current studies). Given that both operationalizations of 
the social saturation construct are related to self-beliefs, this suggests that social 
saturation has both an objective and subjective component (although results from Studies 
2 and 3 do not support the notion that the objective experience of saturation influences 
all participants’ subjective experience of saturation).  
While Study 1 relied entirely on self-reported individual differences in subjective 
experiences, Studies 2 and 3 attempted to experimentally manipulate the objective 
context of social saturation. It was expected that a context filled with connection to 
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others and technology (i.e., objective saturation) would result in the stressful experience 
of overload (i.e., subjective saturation). However, Studies 2 and 3 revealed no 
differences between high and low saturation conditions in either subjective saturation 
(i.e., overload) or general stress, suggesting a disconnect between objective and 
subjective experiences of saturation.  
Although the manipulation failed, there were some interesting trends found in the 
data. Specifically, participants in the high social saturation (vs. low social saturation) 
condition reported less belief in multiple selves, less self-pluralism, less behavioral 
change (Studies 2 and 3) and less self-alienation as well as greater self-concept clarity 
(Study 3). This pattern of results suggests that objective social saturation may indeed 
influence people’s beliefs about their self-concept, but not in the way that was originally 
anticipated (i.e., high saturation may result in less belief in multiple selves). However, 
given that the saturation conditions (i.e., high and low saturation) did not differ in 
subjective saturation, results should be interpreted with caution, as it is not entirely clear 
what it was that was manipulated. Perhaps only technology use versus non-use was 
manipulated, since participants in the high saturation used their smartphones and 
participants in the low saturation condition did not have access to their smartphones. It is 
also possible that I simply manipulated contexts, and the differences were in crowded 
versus not crowded environments.  
Explaining Self-Beliefs: Social Saturation 
Given that results for Studies 2 and 3 were contrary to expectations, it is worth 
considering several explanations for the pattern of results. First, differing characteristics 
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between the participant samples may have influenced our findings. Study 1 supported 
Gergen’s (1991) social saturation hypothesis, such that greater subjective social 
saturation positively predicted perceived stress and belief in multiple selves. Studies 2 
and 3 did not replicate this pattern of results and, if anything, found the opposite pattern. 
Age/generational factors could be an explanation for this inconsistency between studies. 
Specifically, the sample in Study 1 was, on average, much older (36.22) than the college 
samples used in Studies 2 and 3 (average age was 18.47 and 18.73, respectively). 
Participants in Dunn and Castro’s (2012) study also used a sample of older adults (M = 
34.7). The participants in the older sample probably did not grow up immersed in 
technology to the same extent as the college samples. Thus, the college students may be 
less likely to experience the same feelings of “saturation” that older adults feel. That is, 
given that social saturation was defined as something that induces stress from feelings of 
being overwhelmed with possibilities, younger participants may not experience this state 
of being as overwhelming. This may be due to the fact that technology has likely always 
had a pervasive presence in their lives (vs. older adults who have experienced life 
without technology such as computers, social media, etc.), potentially making saturation 
a “default” state (vs. a state of overload), and therefore, less distressing. Future research 
is needed in order to examine potential generational distinctions and how they might 
influence people’s objective and subjective experiences of social saturation. 
College student’s day-to-day immersion in technology may also lead to the 
ability to integrate multiple aspects of their self-concept (e.g., multiple selves) into a 
single coherent self-concept (which would be consistent with Kernis and Goldman’s 
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(2006) conceptualization of a multifaceted self). Given that high saturation participants 
reported both knowing their self more clearly (Study 3) and believing less in multiple 
selves (Study 2), this may indicate that young people see their multiple self-aspects as 
part of a single self-concept, rather than as fractured elements, or differentiated selves. 
Perhaps college students feel like they know themselves best in an environment where 
they are immersed in technological connectedness and integrate aspects of their self 
associated with technology (e.g., their “online” selves) into a coherent self-concept. 
Future research should examine if and how college students integrate technological 
aspects of their life into their self-concept. 
Alternatively, it is also possible that participants in the high saturation condition 
reported less belief in multiple selves (Study 2), less self-alienation, and greater self-
concept clarity (Study 3) due to an inability to process self-related information at a deep 
level. Carr’s (2010) “shallowing hypothesis” claims that people are experiencing 
cognitive shallowing due to their constant immersion/connection to the internet, social 
media, etc. Carr argues that this immersion results in a “re-wiring” of the brain in 
response to the internet’s constant, rapid, and distracting stream of information from a 
multitude of sources. In turn, this re-wiring leads to information being processed at a 
more concrete, surface level (vs. a deeper abstract level) and a reduced ability to engage 
in reflective thought. Recent empirical evidence supports this shallowing hypothesis in a 
variety of domains (e.g., Immordino-Yang, McColl, Damasio, & Damasio, 2009; 
Immordino-Yang, Chistodoulou, & Singh; Trapnell and Sinclair, 2012). Of particular 
importance to the current studies, the shallowing hypothesis suggests that social 
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saturation may deplete the attentional resources people devote to thinking about the self. 
This may explain why participants in Study 2 reported less belief in multiple selves and 
less interest in self-reflection when in a high saturation environment. Perhaps it was 
easier for participants to think about the self on a shallow, surface level as a single 
entity. Considering multiple self-aspects and ways of being may be a deeper and more 
difficult form of self-processing. Future research should explore the potential 
relationship between cognitive shallowing and social saturation and how this influences 
people’s beliefs about their self-concept.  
 Although these findings reveal some interesting insights into social saturation’s 
influence on the self, it is still unclear what the broader implications of social saturation 
are in terms of well-being. Prior research on technology/social media and well-being is 
mixed, with some studies suggesting that online social networking is associated positive 
well-being outcomes (e.g., Ellison, Steinfield, & Lampe, 2007; Grieve, Indian, 
Witteveen, Tolan, & Marrington, 2013; Steinfield, Ellison, & Lampe, 2008; Valenzuela, 
Park, & Kee, 2009), and other studies suggesting negative well-being outcomes 
(Brandtzaeg, 2012; Junco & Cotton, 2011; Kalpidou, Costin, & Morris, 2011; Karpinski, 
Kirschner, Mellott, & Ochwo, 2013; Kross et al., 2013; Wood, Zivcakaova, Gentile, 
Archer, De Pasquale, & Nosko, 2011). Still other research suggests that outcomes are 
influenced by multiple factors such as self-esteem (Forest & Wood, 2012), size of social 
networks (Campisi, Bynog, McGehee, Oakland, Quirk, Taga, & Taylor, 2012; Manago, 
Taylor, & Greenfield, 2012; Rosen, Whaling, Rab, Carrier, & Cheever, 2013), and 
loneliness (Kim, LaRose, & Peng, 2009), among many others (e.g., Becker, Alzahabi, & 
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Hopwood, 2013; Chou and Edge, 2012; Feinstein, Hershenberg, Bhatia, Latack, 
Meuwly, & Davila, 2013; Locatelli, Kluwe, & Bryant, 2012; Seder & Oishi, 2009). 
Other studies simply find no relationship between social networking and well-being 
(Jelenchick, Eickhoff, & Moreno, 2013; Lou, Yan, Nickerson, & McMorris, 2012). 
 Thus, it is clear that further research is needed in order to elucidate the effects 
that technological connection has on well-being outcomes. Relevant to the current 
studies, participants in an objectively high saturation environment did not experience 
subjective feelings of overload. This suggests that high social saturation may not have a 
detrimental effect on college students. Further, given that participants reported less self-
alienation and greater self-concept clarity (which is typically associated with positive 
outcomes such as high self-esteem, less neuroticism, and less public self-consciousness; 
Campbell et al., 1996), it may be that highly saturated contexts are associated with 
positive well-being outcomes for this sample. Future research on more general well-
being should consider age as a potentially important moderator.  
Explaining Self-Beliefs: Stress 
 Study 1 showed that greater subjective social saturation was associated with 
greater belief in multiple selves. However, this relationship became nonsignificant after 
controlling for perceived stress, suggesting that perceived stress is more important for 
predicting self-beliefs than social saturation. This suggests that the relationship between 
objective social saturation and self-pluralism observed in Dunn and Castro’s study may 
also become nonsignificant if perceived stress was controlled for. Studies 2 and 3 also 
show support for the idea that general stress predicts belief in multiple selves. Study 2 
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revealed that state perceived stress was positively related to all three belief in multiple 
selves variables (belief in multiple selves, self-pluralism, and behavioral change) and 
negatively related to self-concept clarity, suggesting that general stress evidences the 
types of effects that were hypothesized to stem from social saturation. Study 3 revealed 
patterns consistent with these results, indicating that state stress was positively related to 
self-pluralism (and trending in the same direction for belief in multiple selves and 
behavioral change) and positively related to self-alienation. Taken together, these results 
suggest that social saturation itself may not result in the outcomes that Gergen (1991) 
predicted. However, it may contribute to an increase in people’s overall levels of stress 
(e.g., Study 1). In this way, Gergen may be both right and wrong in his predictions about 
social saturation. That is, the current data cast doubt on the idea that saturation itself 
leads to greater belief in multiple selves in the way that Gergen suggests. However, 
social saturation may contribute to more general perceived stress, which in turn, may 
lead to greater belief in multiple selves. In this way, social saturation may be indirectly 
related to greater belief in multiple selves. 
Implications of Believing in Multiple Selves 
To the best of my knowledge, the results of the current studies are the first to 
show that stress predicts greater belief in multiple selves, however, it is unclear whether 
holding this belief has positive or negative consequences for well-being. The notion that 
multiple selves may be detrimental to well-being has received some support in the 
psychological literature. For example, Donahue and colleagues (1993) found that people 
who reported high self-concept differentiation (i.e., seeing oneself as having different 
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aspects of personality for different roles) showed poor social adjustment (i.e., lower self-
esteem, greater depression, greater neuroticism) and reported less satisfaction in their 
social roles. Further, a longitudinal analysis revealed that poor emotional adjustment and 
less norm acceptance predicted self-concept differentiation at age 21 and 30 years later. 
Other studies have found similar detrimental effects. For example, researchers have 
found that greater instability of the self-concept was related to maladjustment (Block, 
1961; Smith, 1958) and greater self-pluralism was associated with greater dissociation 
(i.e., the inability to coherently integrate thoughts, emotions, and experiences into 
memory; Suszek, 2005).  
Although several studies show the negative aspects of multiple selves, this 
literature is not comprehensive and future research should examine beneficial/adaptive 
aspects of multiple selves. For example, people who hold dialectical beliefs about their 
self (i.e., that their self-concept is constantly changing, can be composed of 
contradictory aspects, and that all self-aspects are interconnected; Peng & Nisbett, 1999; 
see also Spencer-Rodgers, Williams, & Peng, 2010) may not experience negative 
outcomes related to the need to maintain self-concept consistency (e.g., Boucher, 2011; 
Festinger, 1957; Peng & Nisbett, 1999; Tafarodi, Lo, Yamaguchi, Lee, & Katsura, 
2004), suggesting that belief in multiple selves may have some benefits.   
Limitations  
 Although these studies provide an initial investigation into the ways that social 
saturation influences people’s conceptualizations of their self, the studies are limited in a 
number of ways.  
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 One limitation is that there may be more effective ways of manipulating social 
saturation. For example, the saturation manipulations were likely confounded with 
participants’ familiarity with the environments. Participants were likely to be most 
familiar with the contexts presented to them in the high social saturation conditions and 
less familiar with the contexts in the low social saturation conditions, a factor that could 
have resulted in participants feeling like they knew their self-concept better in these 
environments. Specifically, in Study 2, an average weekday is probably more familiar to 
participants (high saturation) than a vacation on an island (low saturation) and in Study 
3, the student center (high saturation) is more likely to be familiar to participants than 
the art gallery (low saturation). Future research should manipulate social saturation using 
environments that are matched in familiarity (i.e., high and low saturation conditions that 
are either both familiar or both unfamiliar). This potential confound with familiarity may 
have led to contrast effects in the low social saturation conditions. That is, when 
participants thought about a vacation on an island (Study 2) or walked through the art 
gallery (Study 3), this experience may have highlighted just how unlike their daily lives 
these experiences are. Therefore, these tasks may have reminded participants just how 
saturated their lives are by contrast, resulting in participants actually thinking more about 
their day-to-day feelings of saturation. This would support Gergen’s (1991) argument 
that social saturation is such an ingrained part of people’s day-to-day experience that it is 
impossible to fully eliminate the saturation experience. 
  Another limitation may have been the manipulation check items used in Studies 
2 and 3. These items assessed only subjective feelings of social saturation, a potential 
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problem because the objective context of saturation was what we actually manipulated 
(vs. subjective feelings of saturation). Future research should use manipulation check 
items that also assess objective saturation in order to better assess whether manipulations 
of saturation are successful. 
Another potential limitation is the participant sample used in Study 1. 
Specifically, in Study 1, participants were recruited from MTurk, an online study 
platform in which participants sign up for HITs (i.e., studies or tasks) in return for 
financial compensation. Given that every aspect of the study process, from finding the 
study to completing the study, is online, participants are assumed to be technology 
savvy, which also suggest that familiarity may be an issue. 
 Finally, the time that participants spent completing the walking task in Study 3 
may have been a limitation. Specifically, participants in both conditions walked through 
either the student center (high saturation) or the art gallery (low saturation) for eight 
minutes. This may not have been long enough to be completely immersed in technology 
(for the high saturation participants) or long enough to completely disconnect from 
technology (for the low saturation participants). Perhaps it takes more time for 
participants to feel overwhelmed and saturated in their environment and more time to 
disengage from this environment. Future research should explore immersing participants 
in/disconnecting participants from their environments for a greater period of time to 
address this limitation. 
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Conclusions 
The current studies contribute to the psychological literature on technology’s 
influence on the self-concept. Specifically, the current studies empirically investigated 
Gergen’s (1991) social saturation theory—that the self becomes fractured into multiple 
versions due to technological immersion and constant connection to others. Results 
showed mixed support for this theory, suggesting that social saturation itself does not 
directly result in the outcomes predicted by Gergen, but may influence self-beliefs in a 
more indirect way. It may be that saturation contributes to more general stress, which in 
turn may lead to greater belief in multiple selves. Therefore Gergen’s description of the 
postmodern self as a self that is fractured into multiple selves may be accurate, but this 
does not seem to result from technological immersion (as Gergen theorizes), but rather 
from increased stress.   
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ENDNOTES 
 
1 The social saturation scale was broken down into cyber-based saturation (M = 
2.09, SD = .72, α = .92) and place-based saturation (M = 2.50, SD = .79, α = .88); 
following Misra & Stokol (2012). The two subscales were highly correlated (r = .71) and 
a dependent samples t-test revealed that cyber-based saturation and place-based 
saturation did not significantly differ from each other (t (67) = -5.91, p < .001). Further, 
each subscale revealed the same pattern of association with the dependent variables, so 
the two were combined into a single composite. 
2 A similar pattern of results was found for the three scales (multiple selves, self-
pluralism, and behavioral change) that formed the composite belief in multiple selves 
variable. A bivariate correlational analysis revealed that greater social saturation was 
associated with greater belief in multiple selves (r = .40, p = .001), greater self-pluralism 
(r = .36, p = .003), and greater behavioral change (r = .39, p = .001). Further, 
bootstrapping analyses (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) were conducted in which the number 
of bootstrap samples was set to 20,000 and 95% confidence intervals for the bias 
corrected indirect effects were computed. For all three scales (multiple selves, self-
pluralism, and behavioral change), when self-reflection and perceived stress were 
included in the model as mediators, the sized of the effect of social saturation on each 
scale (total effectmultiple selves = .40, p < .001; total effectself-pluralism = .36, p < .01; total 
effectbehavioral change = .39, p < .001) decreased (direct effect multiple selves = .16, p = .20; 
direct effect self-pluralism =  -.002, p = .99; direct effect behavioral change = .15, p = .24), 
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consistent with a mediation pattern. The indirect effect of social saturation on each scale 
was significant, as a 95% confidence interval around the direct effect did not include 
zero (CI multiple selves = .08, .42; CI self-pluralism = .20, .57; CI behavioral change = .09, .43). For all 
three scales, the direct effect became non-significant with the mediators included, 
suggesting full mediation. 
3 In order to explore results using two facets of the manipulation check items, 
compulsion and hassle, the manipulation check items that assess compulsion (“Right 
now, how compelled do you feel to check your email?”, “Right now, how compelled do 
you feel to update your Facebook, Twitter, message/chat application, etc.?”) were 
combined into a compulsion subscale (M = 2.03, SD = 1.00, α = .80) and manipulation 
check items that assess hassle (“Right now, how hassled do you feel with all the 
demands in your school, home, or work environment?”, “Right now, how much do you 
feel like you are constantly shuffling between activities or demands?”) were combined 
into a hassle subscale (M = 3.78, SD = 1.00, α = .79). There were no differences between 
conditions for either the compulsion subscale (t (126) = -.04, p =.97) or the hassle 
subscale (t (126) = .52, p =.60). Given that these two subscales were significantly 
correlated (r = .34, p < .001), the combined reliability was high (α = .75) and there were 
correlations between each subscale and the dependent variables were relatively 
unchanged, the compulsion and hassle subscales were combined into an overall 
subjective social saturation scale.  
4 I counterbalanced the order in which participants completed the measures. Half 
the participants completed the self-reflection prior to the dependent variables (multiple 
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selves measure, self-pluralism, behavioral subscale of the DSS, and self-concept clarity), 
whereas half completed the dependent variables prior to self-reflection. Two 
independent samples t-tests were conducted in order to determine whether there were 
counterbalancing effects within each condition. Results indicated that there were no 
significant counterbalancing effects in either the high social saturation condition 
(tmanipulation check compulsion(63) = .94, p = .35; tmanipulation check hassle (63) = .09, p = .93;  tmultiple 
selves composite (63) = 1.26, p = .21; t self-reflection composite (63) = -.13, p = .89; t perceived stress (63) 
= -1.40, p = .18; tself-concept clarity (63) = .25, p = .80) or low social saturation condition 
(tmanipulation check compulsion(63) = -.04, p = .97; tmanipulation check hassle (63) = 1.00, p = .32;  
tmultiple selves composite (62) = -1.14, p = .26; t self-reflection composite (62) = -.54, p = .59; t perceived 
stress (62) = .87, p = .39; tself-concept clarity (62) = .17, p = .87). 
5  Originally, the manipulation check included six items (“Right now, how much 
do you feel like you are overloaded with things to do?”, “Right now, how much do you 
feel like you have a clear mind?”, “Right now, how connected do you feel to others?”, 
“Right now, how connected do you feel to information?”, “Right now, how hassled do 
you feel with your environment?”, and “Right now, how much do you feel like you are 
constantly dealing with demands on your time?”). However these 6 items were 
evidenced an unacceptably low alpha (.39). Thus, I factor analyzed the six items using 
principal components analysis with Varimax (orthogonal) rotation. The analysis yielded 
two factors, which explained a total of 91.01% of the variance for all the variables. 
Factor 1 explained 34.85% of the variance and was labeled overload due to the high 
loadings of three items: “Right now, how much do you feel like you are overloaded with 
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things to do?”, “Right now, how hassled do you feel with your environment?”, and 
“Right now, how much do you feel like you are constantly dealing with demands on 
your time?”. Factor 2 explained 21.31% of the variance and was labeled 
information/connection due to the high loading of three items: “Right now, how much 
do you feel like you have a clear mind?”, “Right now, how connected do you feel to 
others?”, and “Right now, how connected do you feel to information?”. Factor 1 (M = 
2.92, SD = .87, α = .68) was used as the manipulation check and Factor 2 (M = 3.20, SD 
= .63, α = .36) was dropped due to unacceptably low reliability. 
6 Eight participants in the high social saturation condition were excluded from 
analyses. Specifically, seven participants were excluded because they reported not using 
their cell phones during the walking task and one participant was excluded because he or 
she walked through the art gallery instead of the student center during the walking task. 
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APPENDIX A 
ALL MEASURES INCLUDED IN STUDIES 
 
Social Saturation Measure (Study 1) 
 
In the following questionnaire, you will be presented with a series of statements about 
your thoughts and feelings during the last month. In each case, please indicate how often 
you felt or thought a certain way. Although some of the questions are similar, there are 
differences between them and you should treat each one as a separate question. The best 
approach is to answer each question fairly quickly. That is, don't try to count up the 
number of times you felt a particular way, but rather indicate the alternative that sounds 
like a reasonable estimate using the scale provided. 
 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
         Never      Almost    Sometimes    Fairly   Very 
        never       often  often 
 
 
1. In the last month, how often have you felt overwhelmed with the email messages 
you received? 
2. In the last month, how often have you forgotten to respond to important email 
messages? 
3. In the last month, how often have you felt pressured to respond to email 
messages quickly? 
4. In the last month, how often have you felt that you have received more cell 
phone calls than you can handle? 
5. In the last month, how often have you felt that you have received more 
text/instant messages than you can handle? 
6. In the last month, how often have you felt that you receive more email 
attachments than you can handle? 
7. In the last month, how often have you felt that you have had to spend too much 
time maintaining various information (e.g., updating, downloading apps, 
organizing files, etc.) on the devices you own (e.g.., laptops, desktop computers, 
iPads, cell phones, etc.)? 
8. In the last month, how often have you felt pressured to manage several 
information and communication devices at the same time (e.g., checking your 
email while on the phone, text messaging while checking email, etc.)? 
9. In the last month, how often have you felt that you have too many messages (e.g., 
wall postings, event notifications, personal messages, status updates, and 
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applications) on your Facebook page (or other social networking site) to deal 
with? 
10. In the last month, how often have you felt pressure to update your Facebook 
status, Twitter status, chat status, etc.? 
11. In the last month, how often have you felt that you receive more instant messages 
(e.g., on Facebook, on gChat, etc.) than you can handle? 
12. In the last month, how often have you felt distracted by the email/test/message 
alerts from your communication devices? 
13. In the last month, how often have you failed or forgotten to complete more 
important tasks because you had to respond to emails? 
14. In the last month, how often have you ignored emails, texts, or other types of 
messages because you could not handle so many forms of communication? 
15. In the last month, how often have you opted out of another activity in order to 
check your email or to maintain your social networks? 
16. In the last month, how often have you found yourself doing several activities 
while online (i.e., doing more than one thing simultaneously)? 
17. In the last month, how often have you been so involved with checking your email 
or your social networks that you have forgotten what you had been doing before 
(even just momentarily)? 
18. In the last month, how often have you been so involved with checking your email 
or social networks that you have forgotten where you were or who you were with 
(even just momentarily)? 
19. In the last month, how often have you checked your email/messages/social 
networks while you were having a conversation with someone or out with 
friends? 
20. In the last month, how often have you felt that your work activities left you too 
little time for recreational activities? 
21. In the last month, how often have you felt the urge to "go off the grid" for a 
while? 
22. In the last month, how often have you felt that your work demands made you less 
sensitive to the needs of others? 
23. In the last month, how often have you felt hassled by your commute to work? 
24. In the last month, how often have you felt that you had too many demands in 
your home (e.g., cooking, housework, caring for children) to be able to handle 
comfortably? 
25. In the last month, how often have you felt the demands on you in your work 
place exceeded your capacity to deal with them? 
26. In the last month, how often have you felt that your home environment is too 
noisy? 
27. In the last month, how often have you felt that your work environment is too 
noisy? 
28. In the last month, how often have you felt compelled to look at your phone, 
tablet, or computer while you were engaged in another activity? 
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29. In the last month, how often have you felt that you were constantly shuffling 
between activities or demands? 
30. In the last month, how often did you feel that you had quiet time for reflection? 
31. In the last month, how much did you feel like you were constantly doing 
something? 
32. In the last month, how often did you feel like you had free time? 
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Social Saturation Manipulation (Study 2) 
 
High social saturation condition: 
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Low social saturation condition: 
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Manipulation Check (Study 2) 
For each of the following statements, please indicate whether you felt a certain way 
during the previous task using the scale provided. 
 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
    Not at all              Somewhat        Very much 
           
 
1. Right now, how compelled do you feel to look at your phone? 
2. Right now, how compelled do you feel to check your email? 
3. Right now, how compelled do you feel to check your Facebook status, Twitter 
status, chat status, etc.? 
4. Right now, how hassled do you feel with all the demands in your school, home, 
or work environment? 
5. Right now, how much do you feel like you are constantly shuffling between 
activities or demands? 
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Social Saturation Manipulation (Study 3) 
 
High social saturation condition: 
We all know that college students have busy and sometimes stressful lives. 
Studies have shown that doing a simple physical activity as a “mental break” 
before engaging in a task that requires mental effort reduces stress and aids in 
concentration and performance. In order to improve your concentration in this 
study, we will have you complete a “mental break” task. In this task, we would 
like you to walk through the Memorial Student Center (MSC) for eight minutes 
and then come back to this location, where you will fill out a questionnaire that 
assesses your personality and beliefs about the self. You will be given a timer to 
keep track of time. When the timer beeps after 8 minutes, please push the 
start/stop button on the front of the timer once to stop the timer and head back to 
the research assistant. Given that this is supposed to be a “mental break,” we 
encourage you to talk to your friends if you see them, take out your cell phone 
and check your email, send text messages, or check your Facebook/Twitter/other 
social networking sites as you walk through the MSC, as these types of activities 
have been shown to be mentally refreshing. 
 
Low social saturation condition: 
We all know that college students have busy and sometimes stressful lives. 
Studies have shown that doing a simple physical activity as a “mental break” 
before engaging in a task that requires mental effort reduces stress and aids in 
concentration and performance. In order to improve your concentration in this 
study, we will have you complete a “mental break” task. In this task, we would 
like you to walk through the art gallery for eight minutes and then come back to 
this location, where you will fill out a questionnaire that assesses your 
personality and beliefs about the self. You will be given a timer to keep track of 
time. When the timer beeps after 8 minutes, please push the start/stop button on 
the front of the timer once to stop the timer and head back to the research 
assistant. Given that this is supposed to be a “mental break,” we would like you 
to leave your belongings, including your cell phone behind so that you cannot 
check your email, send text messages, or check your Facebook/Twitter/other 
social networking sites as you walk through the gallery, as “disconnecting” from 
these types of activities has been shown to be mentally refreshing. 
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Manipulation Check (Study 3) 
For each of the following statements, please indicate whether you felt a certain way 
during the previous task using the scale provided. 
 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
    Not at all              Somewhat        Very much 
           
 
1. Right now, how much do you feel like you are overloaded with things to do? 
2. Right now, how much do you feel like you have a clear mind? 
3. Right now, how connected do you feel to others? 
4. Right now, how connected do you feel to information? 
5. Right now, how hassled do you feel with your environment? 
6. Right now, how much do you feel like you are constantly dealing with demands 
on your time? 
 
 
Compliance Check Items (Study 3) 
 
1. Do you own a smart phone? 
2. During your walk at the beginning of the study, did you check your smartphone? 
(high saturation condition only) 
3. Please briefly write about what you did in the walking task that you completed at 
the beginning of the study. Where did you go? What did you see? How did you 
feel? 
 
Mediators 
Self-Reflection (Study 1) 
For each of the following statements, please indicate your level of agreement or 
disagreement using the scale provided. 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
    Strongly            Neither agree           Strongly 
    disagree                       nor disagree                            agree 
 
1. I don’t often think about my thoughts. 
2. I rarely spend time in self-reflection. 
3. I frequently examine my feelings. 
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4. I don’t really think about why I behave the way I do. 
5. I frequently take time to reflect on my thoughts. 
6. I often think about the way I feel about things. 
7. I am not really interested in analyzing my behavior. 
8. It is important for me to evaluate the things that I do. 
9. I am very interested in examining what I think about. 
10. It is very important to me to try to understand what my feelings mean. 
11. Right now, I have a definite need to understand the way that my mind works. 
12. It is important for me to be able to understand how my thoughts arise. 
13. I am usually aware of my thoughts. 
14. I’m often confused about the way that I really feel about things. 
15. I usually have a very clear idea about why I’ve behaved in a certain way. 
16. I’m often aware that I’m having a feeling, but I often don’t quite know what it is. 
17. My behavior often puzzles me. 
18. Thinking about my thoughts makes me more confused. 
19. Often I find it difficult to make sense of the way I feel about things. 
20. I usually know why I feel the way I do.  
 
Perceived Stress (Study 1) 
The questions in this scale ask you about your feelings and thoughts during the last 
month. In each case, you will be asked to indicate how often you felt or thought a certain 
way. Although some of the questions are similar, there are differences between them and 
you should treat each one as a separate question. The best approach is to answer each 
question fairly quickly. That is, don't try to count up the number of times you felt a 
particular way, but rather indicate the alternative that seems like a reasonable estimate. 
Please use the scale provided. 
 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
         Never      Almost    Sometimes    Fairly   Very 
        never       often  often 
 
 
1. In the last month, how often have you been upset because of something that 
happened unexpectedly? 
2. In the last month, how often have you felt that you were unable to control the 
important things in your life? 
3. In the last month, how often have you felt nervous and "stressed"? 
4. In the last month, how often have you dealt successfully with irritating life 
hassles? 
5. In the last month, how often have you felt that you were effectively coping with 
important changes that were occurring in your life? 
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6. In the last month, how often have you felt confident about your ability to handle 
your personal problems? 
7. In the last month, how often have you felt that things were going your way? 
8. In the last month, how often have you found that you could not cope with all the 
things you had to do? 
9. In the last month, how often have you been able to control irritations in your life? 
10. In the last month, how often have you felt that you were on top of things? 
11. In the last month, how often have you been angered because of the things that 
happened that were outside of your control? 
12. In the last month, how often have you found yourself thinking about the things 
that you had to accomplish? 
13. In the last month, how often have you been able to control the way you spend 
your time? 
14. In the last month, how often have you felt difficulties were piling up so high that 
you could not overcome them? 
 
 
State Perceived Stress (Study 2) 
The questions in this scale ask you about your feelings and thoughts right now. In each 
case, you will be asked to indicate how you are feeling or thinking a certain way. Please 
use the scale provided. 
 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
    Strongly            Neither agree           Strongly 
    disagree                       nor disagree                            agree 
 
 
 
______ 1.   I feel upset because of something that happened unexpectedly.  
______ 2.  I feel like I am unable to control the important things in my life. 
______ 3.  I feel nervous or "stressed.”  
______ 4.  I feel like I am successfully dealing with irritating life hassles.  
______ 5.  I feel like I am effectively coping with important changes that are occurring 
in my 
     life. 
______ 6.  I feel confident about my ability to handle my personal problems. 
______ 7.  I feel like things are going my way. 
______ 8.  I feel like I cannot cope with all the things I have to do. 
______ 9.  I feel like I am able to control irritations in my life. 
______ 10.  I feel like I am on top of things. 
______ 11.  I feel angry because of things happening that are outside of my control.  
______ 12.  I find myself thinking about everything that I have to accomplish.  
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______ 13.  I feel like I am able to control the way I spend my time. 
______ 14.  I feel like my difficulties are piling up so high that I cannot overcome 
       them. 
 
Self-Reflection (Studies 2 and 3) 
For each of the following statements, please consider each activity and respond to each 
question about this behavior by CIRCLING your response on the scale below each 
question.  
 
1. Activity: thinking about my thoughts. 
a. How much time do you spend engaged in this activity? 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5 
No time            Some              Very much 
 at all                            time         time  
 
b. How interested are you in engaging in this activity? 
 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5 
           Not at all         Somewhat                Very 
           interested                    interested                         interested 
 
2. Activity: spending time in self-reflection. 
a. How much time do you spend engaged in this activity? 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5 
No time            Some              Very much 
 at all                            time         time  
 
b. How interested are you in engaging in this activity? 
 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5 
           Not at all         Somewhat                Very 
           interested                    interested                         interested 
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3. Activity: examining my feelings. 
a. How much time do you spend engaged in this activity? 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5 
No time            Some              Very much 
 at all                            time         time  
 
b. How interested are you in engaging in this activity? 
 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5 
           Not at all         Somewhat                Very 
           interested                    interested                         interested 
 
4. Activity: thinking about why I behave the way I do. 
a. How much time do you spend engaged in this activity? 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5 
No time            Some              Very much 
 at all                            time         time  
 
b. How interested are you in engaging in this activity? 
 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5 
           Not at all         Somewhat                Very 
           interested                    interested                         interested 
 
5. Activity: taking time to reflect on my thoughts. 
a. How much time do you spend engaged in this activity? 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5 
No time            Some              Very much 
 at all                            time         time  
 
b. How interested are you in engaging in this activity? 
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1                   2                   3                   4                   5 
           Not at all         Somewhat                Very 
           interested                    interested                         interested 
 
6. Activity: thinking about the way I feel about things. 
a. How much time do you spend engaged in this activity? 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5 
No time            Some              Very much 
 at all                            time         time  
 
b. How interested are you in engaging in this activity? 
 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5 
           Not at all         Somewhat                Very 
           interested                    interested                         interested 
 
7. Activity: analyzing my behavior. 
a. How much time do you spend engaged in this activity? 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5 
No time            Some              Very much 
 at all                            time         time  
 
b. How interested are you in engaging in this activity? 
 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5 
           Not at all         Somewhat                Very 
           interested                    interested                         interested 
 
 
8. Activity: evaluating the things that I do. 
a. How much time do you spend engaged in this activity? 
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1                   2                   3                   4                   5 
No time            Some              Very much 
 at all                            time         time  
 
b. How interested are you in engaging in this activity? 
 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5 
           Not at all         Somewhat                Very 
           interested                    interested                         interested 
 
9. Activity: examining what I think about. 
a. How much time do you spend engaged in this activity? 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5 
No time            Some              Very much 
 at all                            time         time  
 
b. How interested are you in engaging in this activity? 
 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5 
           Not at all         Somewhat                Very 
           interested                    interested                         interested 
 
10. Activity: trying to understand what my feelings mean. 
a. How much time do you spend engaged in this activity? 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5 
No time            Some              Very much 
 at all                            time         time  
 
b. How interested are you in engaging in this activity? 
 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5 
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           Not at all         Somewhat                Very 
           interested                    interested                         interested 
 
11. Activity: needing to understand the way that my mind works. 
a. How much time do you spend engaged in this activity? 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5 
No time            Some              Very much 
 at all                            time         time  
 
b. How interested are you in engaging in this activity? 
 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5 
           Not at all         Somewhat                Very 
           interested                    interested                         interested 
 
12. Activity: understanding how my thoughts arise. 
a. How much time do you spend engaged in this activity? 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5 
No time            Some              Very much 
 at all                            time         time  
 
b. How interested are you in engaging in this activity? 
 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5 
           Not at all         Somewhat                Very 
           interested                    interested                         interested 
 
13. Activity: being aware of my thoughts. 
a. How much time do you spend engaged in this activity? 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5 
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No time            Some              Very much 
 at all                            time         time  
 
b. How interested are you in engaging in this activity? 
 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5 
           Not at all         Somewhat                Very 
           interested                    interested                         interested 
 
14. Activity: being confused about the way that I really feel about things. 
a. How much time do you spend engaged in this activity? 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5 
No time            Some              Very much 
 at all                            time         time  
 
b. How interested are you in engaging in this activity? 
 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5 
           Not at all         Somewhat                Very 
           interested                    interested                         interested 
 
15. Activity: having a very clear idea about why I’m behaving in this way. 
a. How much time do you spend engaged in this activity? 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5 
No time            Some              Very much 
 at all                            time         time  
 
b. How interested are you in engaging in this activity? 
 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5 
           Not at all         Somewhat                Very 
           interested                    interested                         interested 
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16. Activity: being aware that I have a feeling, but not knowing quite what it is. 
a. How much time do you spend engaged in this activity? 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5 
No time            Some              Very much 
 at all                            time         time  
 
b. How interested are you in engaging in this activity? 
 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5 
           Not at all         Somewhat                Very 
           interested                    interested                         interested 
 
17. Activity: being puzzled at my behavior. 
a. How much time do you spend engaged in this activity? 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5 
No time            Some              Very much 
 at all                            time         time  
 
b. How interested are you in engaging in this activity? 
 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5 
           Not at all         Somewhat                Very 
           interested                    interested                         interested 
 
18. Activity: thinking about my thoughts and being more confused. 
a. How much time do you spend engaged in this activity? 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5 
No time            Some              Very much 
 at all                            time         time  
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b. How interested are you in engaging in this activity? 
 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5 
           Not at all         Somewhat                Very 
           interested                    interested                         interested 
 
19. Activity: finding it difficult to make sense of the way I feel about things. 
a. How much time do you spend engaged in this activity? 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5 
No time            Some              Very much 
 at all                            time         time  
 
b. How interested are you in engaging in this activity? 
 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5 
           Not at all         Somewhat                Very 
           interested                    interested                         interested 
 
20. Activity: knowing why I feel the way I do. 
a. How much time do you spend engaged in this activity? 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5 
No time            Some              Very much 
 at all                            time         time  
 
b. How interested are you in engaging in this activity? 
 
1                   2                   3                   4                   5 
           Not at all         Somewhat                Very 
           interested                    interested                         interested 
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Affective Stress and Arousal (Study 3) 
Please indicate the extent to which you are experiencing each of the following emotions, 
right now, at this moment. 
 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
    Not at all                Somewhat           Very much 
 
 
______ 1.   Calm  
______ 2.  Contented 
______ 3.  Active 
______ 4.  Vigorous  
______ 5.  Comfortable 
______ 6.  Lively 
______ 7.  Uneasy 
______ 8.  Tired 
______ 9.  Sleepy 
______ 10.  Worried 
______ 11.  Distressed  
______ 12.  Uptight  
______ 13.  Drowsy 
______ 14.  Tense 
______ 15.  Relaxed 
______ 16.  Passive 
______ 17.  Energetic 
______ 18.  Alert 
______ 19.  Bothered 
______ 20.  Aroused 
 
 
 
Positive and Negative Affect (Study 3) 
Please indicate the extent to which you are experiencing each of the following emotions, 
right now, at this moment. 
 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
    Not at all                Somewhat           Very much 
 
 
______ 1.   Positive 
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______ 2.  Negative 
______ 3.  Good 
______ 4.  Bad  
______ 5.  Pleasant 
______ 6.  Unpleasant 
______ 7.  Happy 
______ 8.  Sad 
______ 9.  Afraid 
______ 10.  Joyful 
______ 11.  Angry  
______ 12.  Contented  
 
 
Dependent variables: 
 
Belief in Multiple Selves (Studies 1, 2, and 3) 
The following questions assess your opinions about the self. Please indicate your 
agreement or disagreement with each statement using the scale provided.  
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
    Strongly            Neither agree           Strongly 
    disagree                       nor disagree                            agree 
 
1. People have multiple "true" selves, each representing a different role. 
2. I have multiple selves I can draw qualities from depending on the situation. 
3. I feel like I have an "online self" and an "offline self." 
4. Who I am depends on the environment. 
 
 
Self-pluralism (Studies 1, 2, and 3) 
 
The following questions assess your opinions about the self. Please indicate your 
agreement or disagreement with each statement using the scale provided.  
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
    Strongly            Neither agree           Strongly 
    disagree                       nor disagree                            agree 
 
 
1. People who know me well would say I'm pretty predictable. 
2. I have fairly big mood swings. 
3. Sometimes, I'm surprised at myself for the ways I feel or the things I do. 
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4. I act and feel essentially the same way whether at home, at work, or with friends. 
5. Sometimes I behave so differently in different situations that people would have 
difficulty recognizing me as the same person. 
6. I occasionally behave in a way unlike my normal self. 
7. I'm the same sort of person regardless of who I'm with. 
8. There have been times when I did not remember a series of things I had done, or 
the way that I had behaved. 
9. Sometimes I feel like two (or more) persons under the same skin. 
10. Though I behave differently in different situations (for example, at a party, at 
work, at home), I always feel the same inside. 
11. I get along best when I act and feel like a totally different person at different 
times. 
12. If each of the different people who know me well were asked to describe me, the 
descriptions would be much the same. 
13. I only have minor changes in mood. 
14. One side of my personality is quite different from the other side. 
15. I am the same kind of person in every way, day in and day out. 
16. There are parts of me that are so different that I have given them different names. 
17. I am almost never surprised at the way I behave or feel. 
18. I sometimes feel inside like a different person than at other times, but this never 
seems apparent to other people. 
19. People who know me would say that my behavior changes from situation to 
situation. 
20. My personality is always the same, regardless of whom I'm with or the situation 
I'm in. 
21. If I were to describe myself in detail I'd have to use two (or more) different 
descriptions. 
22. People who know me well would say I act quite differently at different times. 
23. Though I vary somewhat from time to time, in general I always feel much the 
same. 
24. I have tow (or more) distinct personalities and at any given time I'm either one or 
the other. 
25. I change very little from time to time or from one situation to another. 
26. Sometimes I feel pretty different from the way I feel at other times, but generally 
I feel the same way. 
27. There have been times when I felt like a completely different person from what I 
was from the day before. 
28. People who know me well would say I behave basically the same in all 
circumstances. 
29. I sometimes have conflicts over whether to be one kind of person or a different 
kind. 
30. I go along on a pretty even keel from day to day. 
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Behavioral change subscale of the Dialectical Self Scale (Studies 1, 2, and 3) 
 
Listed below are a number of statements about your thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. 
Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with each statement using the 
scale provided.  
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
    Strongly            Neither agree           Strongly 
    disagree                       nor disagree                            agree 
 
 
1. I am the same around my family as I am around my friends. 
2. I believe my habits are hard to change. 
3. I often change the way I am, depending on who I am with. 
4. The way I behave usually has more to do with immediate circumstances than 
with my personal preferences. 
5. My outward behaviors reflect my true thoughts and feelings. 
6. I am constantly changing and am different from one time to the next. 
7. I usually behave according to my principles. 
8. I sometimes find that I am a different person by the evening than I was in the 
morning. 
 
 
Self-Concept Clarity (Studies 2 and 3) 
 
The following questions assess your opinions about the self. Please indicate your 
agreement or disagreement with each statement using the scale provided.  
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
    Strongly            Neither agree           Strongly 
    disagree                       nor disagree                            agree 
 
 
1. My beliefs about myself often conflict with one another. 
2. On one day I might have one opinion of myself and on another day I might have 
a different opinion. 
3. I spend a lot of time wondering about what kind of person I really am. 
4. Sometimes I feel that I am not really the person that I appear to be. 
5. When I think about the kind of person I have been in the past, I’m not sure what I 
was really like. 
6. I seldom experience conflict between the different aspects of my personality. 
7. Sometimes I think I know other people better than I know myself. 
8. My beliefs about myself seem to change very frequently. 
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9. If I were asked to describe my personality, my description might end up being 
different from one day to another day. 
10. Even if I wanted to, I don’t think I could tell someone what I’m really like. 
11. In general, I have a clear sense of who I am and what I am. 
12. It is often hard for me to make up my mind about things because I don’t really 
know what I want. 
 
Self-Alienation (Study 3) 
The following questions assess your opinions about the self. Please indicate your 
agreement or disagreement with each statement using the scale provided.  
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
    Strongly            Neither agree           Strongly 
    disagree                       nor disagree                            agree 
 
1. I don’t know how I really feel inside. 
2. I feel as if I don’t know myself very well. 
3. I feel out of touch with the “real me.” 
4. I feel alienated from myself. 
 
